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Off the scale but out of sight:

The rise and rise of temporary migration

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The
Frenchie

Introduction

They are Italians making cappuccinos at the front bar of cafes in Glebe and Carlton, and Indians washing dishes out the back. They are accounting lecturers from Britain running classes in Brisbane full of students from Beijing. They are American mining engineers and Taiwanese meatworkers, Filipino nurses and French au pairs. They are also medical specialists, climate scientists and the CEOs of ASX 200 businesses. They are the Indian IT contractors who come to city offices to fix computers, and Malaysian students who enter the same office late at night to push vacuum cleaners and polish desks. Some are even more invisible, their cut-rate work surfacing in supermarkets as mounds of cut-price cucumbers. These are Australia's temporary migrants, and though they are not officially part of the nation, they are changing it.

In the past year, Australia has embarked on the largest and most sustained immigration debate since the maiden speech of Pauline Hanson in 1996, perhaps since the Fitzgerald Report of 1988. So far the argument has focused on housing, congestion and infrastructure pressures in our big cities, but simmering below the surface are debates about integration and, beyond them, the ethnic and racial composition of the migrant intake. Immigration policy has also become extremely complex. This second research narrative for the Scanlon Applied Social Cohesion Research Institute seeks to shed light on one of the most vital - but least visible - aspects of that policy: temporary migration.

Like the first narrative, published in September 2018, this paper draws on recent research and commentary from Australian and international universities, think tanks, public servants and journalists. It discusses the impact of temporary migration on Australia's economy, society and people, and on the migrants themselves, some of whom have lived here for many years and want to stay, but who, in the memorable title of ***a 2016 book on temporary migration*** by journalist Peter Mares, are *"not quite Australian."*

Crunching the numbers

In the six years to June 2018, Australia accepted about 190,000 permanent migrants plus an average of nearly 16,000 refugees a year. Although migration numbers fell to 162,000 in 2017-18, over the past decade more migrants have come to Australia, per capita, than to nearly all other OECD countries. Among those with populations of more than 10 million, only Canada's immigration levels match Australia's.

Yet permanent migration is not the only driver of the record growth in Australia's population, which reached 25 million last year. The growth of temporary migration has also been spectacular. And while the number of permanent migrants carries an effective annual ceiling, temporary migration has none.

In June 2006, there were about 350,000 international students, working holiday makers and temporary skilled workers in Australia. By June 2018, that number had more than doubled, to almost 840,000. Over 12 years, these three categories of temporary migration alone have increased Australia's population by an extra 40,000 people a year, on average. If New Zealanders and bridging visa holders are counted, then temporary migration has added about 72,000 people a year.

Temporary migrants' exact impact on population numbers is hard to measure, since many leave as well as arrive. It is also hard to know how long individual temporary migrants have been here, since visa statistics track movements in and out of the country rather than individuals, who may come and go a number of times. Nevertheless, one powerful measure of the growth of temporary migration is the fact that on September 30 this year, more than 2.2 million people were in the country on temporary visas, ***according to Home Affairs figures.***


DONESIA
PAPUA
NEW
GUINEA
SOLOMON ISLANDS
VANUATU
NEW CALEDONIA (FRANCE)
AUSTRALIA
TASMANIA
(AUSTRALIA)
NEW ZEALAND

Of course, that figure includes 325,000 tourists and other short-stay visitors (who are not classified as temporary migrants because they spend less than a year here), plus 682,000 New Zealanders.[1] Even so, that leaves about a million temporary migrants with the right to work. The big three groups are made up of 152,000 migrants on temporary skilled working visas, 136,000 working holiday makers,[2] and 575,000 international students.

Temporary migrants hail from many places. One in five skilled workers comes from India. Nearly two in five international students – more than half in NSW – come from China. Working holidaymakers, who are typically aged between 18 and 31, are most likely to come from Britain, South Korea, Taiwan and Germany. The impact of these groups, as workers and consumers, is profound. Important sectors of the economy – notably education, construction, tourism, aged care, horticulture and hospitality – have come to rely on them. Most strikingly, international students fund the country's third biggest export industry, worth $28.6 billion a year and directly employing 130,000 people. In New South Wales, they make up about a quarter of all university students and of university revenue.

Yet temporary migrants' influence on our economy has for many years been matched by their invisibility in our politics – until this year, when they surfaced, uneasily, in public debate.

[1] Nearly all New Zealanders are granted the same visa on arrival, which is technically a temporary visa, but allows them to work and stay indefinitely. Since it is impossible to tell from visa statistics whether a New Zealander is a long-term resident or a short term visitor they are not discussed in this paper. Nor are an estimated 30,000 asylum seekers who arrived by boat and who are on bridging or temporary protection visas. Like New Zealanders, their circumstances are very different to those of most temporary migrants.

[2] Not all working holiday makers are classified as temporary migrants. To be counted in Australia's population a migrant has to have spent 12 of the previous 16 months in Australia, and most working holidaymakers stay less than a year.

Temporary migrants: a new political piñata?

Suddenly, political leaders are saying that if cities are too congested or young people cannot find jobs, temporary migration is the cause.

In September 2018, Prime Minister Scott Morrison rejected ***"this idea that the permanent immigration intake is the thing fuelling population growth."*** To explain, he compared Australia to a bus, with rising population levels putting 10 more people on it. *"Just over four of them are temporary migrants. Just under four of them were born here, a natural increase. And only two of them are permanent migrants."*

A month later, Opposition Leader Bill Shorten promised that ***Labor in government would cut temporary migration*** to ensure that jobs went to Australian workers first. *"I think that there shouldn't be a temporary labour worker from overseas a day longer than we can take to train one of our own,"* he said.

But these comments from our political leaders are at best unclear, at worst misleading. While temporary migrants do briefly crowd the bus, they either eventually transition to permanent residence – about half of all permanent migrants were temporary migrants first – or they leave Australia. Over the long-term, the big driver of population growth remains permanent migration.

Mr Shorten's remarks also left much in doubt. Labor and the unions have long been critical of temporary migration. But does Mr Shorten want temporary migrants to become permanent or to leave? If the latter, how many should leave? He did not say, perhaps because either option would have a major impact on Australia's immigration numbers and policy, and with an election looming Mr Shorten is unlikely to want to have that discussion.

But it is time that Australia did. Public debate is only now catching up to the fact that in recent decades the migration program has been transformed. Australia built a large part of its post-war population on the idea of permanent settlement, of new arrivals essentially committing to stay in Australia from day one. Today, a sizeable majority of the migrants who arrive in any one year are here on temporary visas. They help to explain why the centres of large Australian cities, especially Sydney and Melbourne, have rapidly become global spaces, with crowds on the street and cranes in the sky – spaces where many accents are Asian and European and the distinction between local and foreigner is unclear, and perhaps unimportant. Some Australians find these changes exciting, others troubling. Either way, they are more signs of the dizzying pace of modern life, and they raise questions about the sort of nation Australia is becoming.

What is the impact on society when a significant part of its population is comprised of visitors? Does the change threaten the bonds that hold it together, or is the churn of people an inevitable, even desirable, effect of a globalised world? Should Australia accept both skilled and unskilled temporary migrants, especially when the latter are in particular danger of workforce exploitation? And finally, what obligations, if any, does Australia have to accept permanently these visitors who, as Mares writes in his book, *"live here, contribute to the economic and cultural life of the nation, pay its taxes and obey its laws, but are denied access to many government services and benefits, and cannot vote"*?

To understand these questions, we need to look more closely at temporary migrants and how, over the past two decades, they quietly came to play a prominent role in Australian life.

A short history of temporary migration to Australia

Four big shifts mark Australian migration policy since World War II.

From 1945, with the creation of the post-war migration program, Australia gradually opened its doors to migrants from countries beyond Britain and Ireland. From the 1960s the nation began to dismantle the White Australia policy, which was finally abandoned in 1973. From about 1985 it placed increasing emphasis on skilled migration, so that skilled migrants now comprise about two-thirds of the permanent intake. From about 2000 to 2005, it began what Peter Mares has called *"the permanent shift to temporary migration."* The first three attracted much attention when they were announced, but not the fourth.

For nearly 60 years from 1945, policymakers generally opposed temporary migration, and especially migrants coming to Australia on temporary visas then seeking permanent residence onshore. Instead, Immigration Department officials selected most of Australia's migrants overseas. Once approved, the newcomers were offered a quick start to permanent residency and citizenship, and given help to integrate. That was the Australian way. But the mining boom of the early 2000s changed the game.

As this once-in-a-century event gathered pace, not only mining companies but businesses across the country began clamouring for labour. The agriculture sector was especially vocal as rural workers left for better paid jobs in the mines. The Howard Government suddenly found itself under pressure from business, from the Opposition, which accused it of creating skills shortages through its big cuts to higher education, and from Treasury, which began to warn about the effects on the future workforce of falling fertility rates and an ageing population. Workers had to be found fast, and the permanent migration program, with its long lead times between the selection and settlement of migrants, was deemed to be inadequate to the task.

Instead, the government retooled three temporary migration programs. The 457 visa, introduced in 1996 to facilitate intra-company transfers of high-level executives, became a visa for a wide range of skilled – then semi-skilled – workers. The working holiday program, created in the 1970s to allow backpackers from Australia, the UK, Ireland and Canada to have reciprocal work rights in each other's countries

in the spirit of cultural exchange, was transformed in 2005 to allow young foreign travellers (now sourced from a much wider range of countries) to spend a second year in Australia if they spent three months working in agriculture. Perhaps most significantly, in 2005 the government provided international students with a near automatic pathway from graduation in Australia to permanent residency. It was a decisive move. Within three years, numbers of overseas students had risen by almost 86 per cent.

These changes triggered Australia's largest ever immigration wave, in absolute terms. John Howard had been known to harbour unease about the pace of Asian immigration. In 1996 his government had cut immigration numbers severely when it came to power. In the early 21st century it unleashed a migration boom led by Indians and Chinese on temporary visas, a historic change not just to the number but to the nature of Australia's immigrants. Did Mr Howard know what he was doing? In the midst of these seismic changes, in about 2006, he continued to insist that Australia was a nation of permanent settlement – *"I think you either invite somebody to stay as a permanent resident or a citizen or you don't."* [3]

The changes brought many benefits. Instead of a Canberra bureaucrat predicting the economy's future skill needs and setting occupational quotas accordingly, companies were given the power to determine what kinds of workers they needed, bring them in on fixed contracts and put them to work from day one. In what economist Bob Gregory termed *"two-step migration,"* permanent migrants were increasingly chosen from people already in the country, as skilled workers on a temporary skilled work visa or international students. That meant they were already at home in Australia, and their employers knew them before sponsoring them for permanent residency.

Perhaps the most striking change has been that after six months of settlement, almost nine in ten skill-stream migrants have jobs and six in ten have highly skilled jobs. These migrants have higher rates of employment, education and earnings than the general population. They are also young: more than half of the two largest groups in 2016-17, Chinese and Indians, are under the age of thirty-five. While those surveyed in the Home Affairs Department's Continuous Survey of Australian Migrants are permanent migrants, not temporary, two-thirds of them arrived on a temporary visa.

[3] Quoted in Peter Mares, Not Quite Australian: How Temporary Migration is Changing the Nation, Text Publishing 2016.

As a result of their high employment rates, far from draining the government purse, they enrich it. For example, the Treasury calculates that migrants who came here in 2014-15 will pay $9.6 billion more in taxes, over their lifetimes, than they take out in benefits. Most arrive as young adults, either already with a tertiary education, or they get one here, on full fees. Those on a temporary visa get no access to most government services and benefits, while paying full rates of income tax and GST. Even after they gain permanent residence, they must wait two years – which the Government is trying to extend to four – before they can access all social security benefits. For the government, they are a goldmine.

In a 2014 paper, ***The Two-Step Australian Immigration Policy and its Impact on Immigrant Employment Outcomes,*** Professor Gregory saw these outcomes as *"phenomenal,"* but he also saw a problem for the future. Permanent visas were effectively capped but temporary visas were both privatised and uncapped: essentially, employers and tertiary institutions chose how many were allocated. If the pool of temporary migrants in the country increased over time but the permanent migration intake remained the same, this would create a tension. Gregory predicted that the number of temporary migrants – faced with shrinking opportunities to become permanent residents – might begin to fall. Australia may be reaching that point now.

There was a second dramatic effect, one that was not immediately apparent. Governments were happy to accept the budgetary and economic benefits that migration provided. But, distracted by years of bitter argument over asylum seekers, alarmed by terrorist attacks overseas, they stopped the practice of previous governments since World War II of celebrating migration and encouraging migrants to take out citizenship. The Australian story shrunk; migration became not about nation-building but the national bottom line. Migration is simply *"recruiting,"* Malcolm Turnbull, then Prime Minister, ***told a radio announcer in July 2018.*** *"What we've got to do is use our migration program in the same way that a company would use its HR department, and make sure you're recruiting the best and the brightest and not recruiting anyone you don't want or you don't need."* Former Prime Ministers such as Malcolm Fraser and Bob Hawke would never have discussed immigration in such narrowly economic terms. But in this regard, Australia is not alone.

Temporary migration around the world

Temporary migration is not new, as researchers Anna Boucher of the University of Sydney and Justin Gest of George Mason University in the USA show in their 2018 book, *Crossroads: Comparative Immigration Regimes in a World of Demographic Change.*

Between 1942 and 1964, about 4.5 million Mexicans came to the United States as seasonal farm labourers under the Bracero Program (large-scale illegal immigration from Mexico essentially followed the closure of the program). The post-war economic boom drove various European countries, notably Germany, the Netherlands and France, to invite largely unskilled guest workers to work in their factories and otherwise boost their labour forces. Three-quarters of a million Turks came to Germany between 1961 and 1972.

As their oil wealth rose to unprecedented levels in the mid-1970s, the Gulf States imported eleven million foreign workers, mainly from Pakistan, India and Bangladesh. Today about two-thirds of the workforce of Saudi Arabia and 90 per cent of the workforce of the Emirate of Dubai are made up of foreign workers. These workers have almost no rights, are highly vulnerable to exploitation by employers, and have no avenue to citizenship or to the generous welfare provisions available to locals. While most are male, a fifth are women working as domestic servants. If they lose their job, they must leave the country.

In 16 of the 30 nations Dr Boucher and Dr Gest study in their book, temporary economic migrants comprised at least half of all admissions.[4] In 2011 (the most recent comparative figures) they comprised 58 per cent of migrant flows into Australia, 65 per cent into New Zealand, about 70 per cent into Brazil and South Korea, 83 per cent into Russia, and 99 per cent into Singapore. Immigration within the European Union is dominated by temporary migrant flows among member countries. The United States, by contrast, has been less inclined to use temporary migration programs, yet its population of undocumented workers, mainly from Mexico, numbers about 11 million.

Dr Boucher and Dr Gest write that nations are embracing temporary migration because, while these workers pay taxes, they are often ineligible for welfare and other benefits such as education and health. Above all, they do not have to be made citizens.

[4] For a full definition of how the authors calculated flows of temporary economic migrants, see chapter 5 of their book.


ITALIANA
AGGIATORI
Per l'Italia

Temporary migration *"reflects governments' desire to enjoy the economic benefits of immigration without open acceptance of the societal and demographic transformations that might result."*

Around the world, including in Australia, naturalisation rates have fallen since 2000. More governments are demanding that migrants show they have integrated before they can become citizens. Canada is an outlier: while having relatively high flows of temporary migrants, it also has by far the world's highest naturalisation rate, and it takes an elevated share of humanitarian migrants.

In her 2016 book, *The New Politics of Immigration and the End of Settler Societies,* Canadian academic Catherine Dauvergne writes that *"as the settler society ethos is stripped away, economics is often left as the only evident explanatory factor remaining (for high migration)."* Dr Boucher and Dr Gest agree, arguing that many nations are abandoning or rejecting the approach of traditional settler states, notably an open admissions policy backed up by multicultural policies and absorption of migrants as citizens. Instead, *"states are returning to systems akin to the guest worker approach implemented in Europe in the mid-twentieth century."*

Yet despite the often brutal conditions of guest worker life, migrants can always be found. One in four Moldovans is estimated to live either temporarily or permanently in other countries. Eight million Filipinos – one in 10 – work abroad, sending home money that supports half the nation's households while leaving nine million children without at least one parent. Three quarters of these workers are Filipino women. People move because migration is one of the most powerful forces to reduce poverty on Earth. The World Bank calculates that the remittances that migrants send to their families at home is three times the aid budget of the entire developed world.

Such realities drive Branko Milanovic, a leading economist and specialist in inequality, to propose a radical change to global migration. In a November 2018 article for the website Social Europe, ***Migration into Europe: a Long-Term Solution?***, Milanovic points to the impasse between the increasing incentives for citizens of poor nations to migrate and the rising anxiety of rich nations about this migration. Europe needs migrants for economic reasons but its citizens increasingly oppose it for cultural reasons. Is there an alternative to open borders on the one hand and Fortress Europe on the other?

Milanovic thinks there might be. Under his proposal, European (and other wealthy) nations would only or mainly accept workers that come to do specific jobs for a limited period of time. After that time – say five years – had expired, they would have to return home. Other migrants would then replace them. These migrant workers should have the same rights as citizens in the workplace, but not the vote or welfare benefits unrelated to their work.

Milanovic accepts that such *"circular migration"* risks creating two classes of residents in the host nation. Yet, he writes, it might be an inevitable outcome of globalisation, and the fact that *"as one's place of work no longer necessarily coincides with the place where one lives, citizenship with all of its prerogatives will likewise become more fluid."* It's worth noting, too, that poorer nations often support temporary migration, not only because of the remittances it brings but because their citizens eventually come home, often with more skills than they had before.

Nevertheless, such a change would be epochal, dispensing with *"the two-centuries-old duality where you were either a citizen with all duties and rights, or not a citizen and thus outside that particular community."* Many Australians would resist it. Australia is not a guest worker society: its migrants enjoy the same workplace rights as locals, even if the law is not always observed, and pathways to citizenship, although narrowing, remain. But as the rest of this paper shows, changes now underfoot are already presenting profound challenges to the Australian model.

Temporary migration through a global lens: a case study from the bush

In November 2018 the Prime Minister, Scott Morrison, announced that his government *would ease restrictions on two temporary migration programs*, the working holidaymaker scheme and a program for Pacific Island workers, in order to ensure that farmers had enough labour to pick their crops.

The decision, which is designed to attract more backpackers and Pacific Islanders to work on farms by allowing them to stay longer in the country, followed sustained lobbying by the National Farmers' Federation, which has claimed that farmers needed 100,000 more seasonal workers.

While the federation has provided no evidence for such a high number, there is no doubt that farmers' anxiety about labour, and belief that not enough locals will do it, is intense. In September the regionally-based National Party even proposed a new agricultural visa that would have opened farm labour to temporary workers from Indonesia, Vietnam and other Asian countries. Mr Morrison vetoed it on the basis that it would undercut a separate initiative, the Seasonal Worker Program.

This program enables workers from 10 Pacific Island nations and Timor-Leste (mainly men to date) to find jobs at wages that are much higher than they would earn at home. About 8500 visas were issued in 2017-18, mainly to ni-Vanuatu and Tongans. Pacific Island leaders had protested against the Nationals' plan to hire Asian labour, and Mr Morrison feared that its adoption would damage relations with these states, thereby enabling China to strengthen its already rising influence in the region.

Unusually for a temporary migration initiative, the Seasonal Worker Program is supported by both main political parties. *The World Bank endorses* it as one of the very few migration schemes around the world that is explicitly designed to assist economic development in the source countries for workers. To date it is small but it grew significantly last year and Australian National University economist Stephen Howes *has argued on the DevPolicy Blog* that it could grow much more. *"Already over 10 per cent of Tongans aged 20–45 travel overseas every year for seasonal work in Australia and New Zealand."* For the workers, *"that opportunity is transformational."*

Yet for every Pacific Islander working on an Australian farm, there are four working holidaymakers. The horticultural sector has come to rely almost entirely on backpackers to harvest its crops (which explains why farmers fiercely protested against the government's proposal in the 2015 Budget to scrap the tax-free threshold for working holidaymakers and to tax them at 32.5 cents in the dollar). Advocates of seasonal workers from the Pacific fear that the program could be substantially damaged by the government's moves to expand the number of working holiday makers working on farms. The question for Australia, Professor Howes writes, is *"whether we mainly want Pacific Islanders or rich-country foreigners picking our fruit and vegetables."*

Both Pacific Islanders and working holidaymakers risk serious exploitation. Yet the Seasonal Worker Program provides better protections by requiring employers to be registered, to shoulder some costs, and to produce an employment plan. Working holidaymakers, by contrast, are more exposed to risks in what Professor Howes called *"the wild west of Australia's labour markets – horticulture."*

Exploitation of temporary migrants: how bad is it?

Two British backpackers earn $8.75 an hour to feed crocodiles and clean their pens in far north Queensland. A former Perth curry house operator is charged with underpaying a Bangladeshi worker by more than $38,000, then dismissing him when the man lodged a worker's compensation claim after injuring his back at work.

The head contractor at the Melbourne Cricket Ground is fined $132,000 for underpaying 11 workers, mostly overseas students+ from India, the Philippines, Colombia and Brazil, who cleaned the ground after football games. The former operators of a Canberra massage parlour are charged with allegedly underpaying seven Filipino workers more than $900,000 and threatening to have their families in the Philippines killed if they complained to the Home Affairs Department.

These recent cases launched by the Fair Work Ombudsman (FWO) came at the same time as a 2015 investigation by the ABC and Fairfax uncovered ***systemic underpayment of international students by 7-Eleven stores***. A 2016 Fairfax report also revealed that ***hundreds of Malaysian workers were being brought to Australia illegally*** to pick fruit for as little as a few dollars an hour, wages that a lawyer who represented one of the workers described as *"modern-day slavery."*

Do temporary migrant workers represent Australia's worst form of workplace exploitation? Not necessarily. In 2014 the then Fair Work Ombudsman, Natalie James, said that getting employers to comply with minimum employment standards for all workers was ***"a major and ongoing challenge."***

Yet Allan Fels, chair of the Federal Government's Migrant Workers Taskforce, which is due to report late in 2018, ***told Fairfax*** that significant numbers of migrant workers were *"really exploited…There is enough evidence to say that it is systemic."* In a 2018 SBS article on temporary migration, ***All Work, No Stay,*** Peter Mares shows that while temporary migrants are estimated to make up 6 per cent or less of the Australian labour force, they were involved in 18 per cent of the FWO's cases on behalf of workers in 2016-17, more than twice as many as a few years before. ***The 2017 National Temporary Migrant Work survey*** of 4300 workers found that while wage theft was prevalent across a range of industries, the worst paid jobs were in fruit and vegetable picking and farm work. Almost one in three survey participants who had worked in these sectors earnt $10 an hour or less. Almost one in seven earnt $5 an hour or less.

It wasn't meant to be this way. The working holidaymaker visa was originally designed for cultural exchange. But a 2016 FWO inquiry into the visa expressed concern that the incentive for backpackers to work for three months in agriculture in order to obtain a second year in Australia had turned the program into essentially a source of cheap labour. The result was *"exploitative workforce cultures and behaviour occurring in isolated and remote workplaces."*

In 2015, the inquiry investigated a northern NSW business that supplied cucumbers to Coles and Woolworths and local stores. At the time it was one of the state's top five businesses using working holidaymakers for labour. All its 15 to 20 workers were backpackers, who were fed and housed in caravans but not paid, the inquiry found. When the inquiry visited the business again a year later, it learnt that the workers were now receiving pay slips claiming they had been paid at $17.29 an hour (the relevant minimum wage) when in fact the employer was withholding wages to cover food and accommodation. When challenged, the director said that without using unpaid labour, the business could not grow and sell cucumbers at a profit.

Other employers were no less defiant about underpaying working holidaymakers, telling the inquiry that since most visa holders performed low-skilled work, they should not be entitled to Australian minimum pay rates. These attitudes raise the possibility that significantly expanding the working holidaymaker or seasonal worker programs without a corresponding rise in oversight could, over time, lead to the creation of a large population of unprotected and underpaid foreign workers on American lines. This would be a sea change in Australia.

Many exploited working holidaymakers seemed to accept illegal pay and conditions as inevitable. They worried that if they complained, their employer would not sign the form proving they qualified for a second year in Australia. Some working holidaymakers from Taiwan and South Korea also said that wages in Australia, even when beneath legal minimums, were higher than minimum wages in their countries, which in 2016 were $AUD5.05 and $6.86 respectively. Studies of international students have found them similarly resigned to being exploited in the workplace.

What of temporary skilled workers? A 2015 paper by researchers Joo-Cheong Tham, Iain Campbell and Martina Boese, ***Why is Labour Protection for Temporary Migrants Workers so Fraught? A Perspective from Australia,*** shows that they are also at risk of exploitation.

Temporary skilled workers, unlike students and most backpackers, rely on their employers' goodwill in order to be sponsored for permanent residence. Employers' frequent observations that these migrants work harder and are more co-operative than Australian workers may simply reflect the fact that they are careful not to make trouble, even at the expense of their rights and safety. Even so, complaints received by the Fair Work Ombudsman's Overseas Worker Team in 2013 accounted for one in ten complaints received by the Ombudsman, though these workers comprised a mere 1 per cent of the workforce.

Various Immigration Ministers have characterised exploiters of 457 workers as *"unscrupulous"* or *"rogue"* employers, but the authors of the 2015 paper show that the problem is less individual than structural. Many of the industries that are most likely to underpay or otherwise exploit their workers – in particular, accommodation and food services, retail and construction – are precisely those in which many temporary skilled workers seek employment. In these industries wages are relatively low, union coverage limited, and precariousness of employment high.

It is important to note, however, that in a range of studies, a majority of temporary skilled workers, working holidaymakers and students report positive workplace experiences in Australia. More broadly, despite problems, temporary migrants have a good story to tell.

The views of temporary migrants themselves

A theme that recurs in much research on temporary migrants is how little Australians know about them. The contributions of temporary migrants *"to Australian life and society outside the economic sphere have been little studied,"* write the authors of *Experiences of Temporary Residents,* a 2016 report for the Department of Immigration and Border Protection (now Home Affairs). In 30 years of working in the media, the author of this narrative can recall no major piece of journalism on the lives of international students, even though they now number half a million.

Hence the significance of Experiences of Temporary Residents, which is based on a large survey of nearly 5000 temporary migrants (albeit one slightly limited by under-representation of their largest groups, Indian and Chinese migrants). The government did not release the report, which the Scanlon Institute obtained under Freedom of Information.

The report showed that the great majority – 85 per cent – of temporary residents surveyed said they felt positive about the Australian way of life. Nearly two-thirds felt a sense of belonging to Australian social and cultural life, and just over half felt a sense of belonging to their neighbourhood.

Nevertheless, a significant minority of 37 per cent said they felt closer to their own ethnic or home community and culture than to mainstream Australia, even while most of this group also felt positive about the Australian way of life. Temporary migrants who came from Majority English Speaking Countries had a stronger sense of belonging in Australia than did those from Non-English Speaking Countries. Most troubling was the finding that nearly one in three temporary residents perceived that they had experienced racism or prejudice while in Australia, mostly outside the workplace. Those who found English more challenging were more likely to suggest they had encountered racism than were more confident English speakers.

International students felt just as positive about Australia as other migrants in the survey, yet they were most likely to express a sense of loneliness and lack of belonging in the country. While many cited a desire to better understand western culture as the reason they had come to Australia, the report found that "international students do not often cohere or engage easily with local communities and would like more opportunities to get involved in community activities." In general, they socialised most with people from their home country. One survey showed that more than a quarter of domestic students thought there were too many international students on their campus. Accommodation and living costs also troubled foreign students, and research cited in the report suggested that significant numbers experienced severe financial hardship during their studies.

By contrast, skilled workers on temporary visas were much less likely to qualify their satisfaction with Australia. They were positive about their work experience – as were their employers – and a high proportion planned to seek permanent residency. Overall, two-thirds of temporary residents who were still in Australia when they completed the survey hoped to remain, either for the longer term or for good. Only about a quarter intended to leave Australia when their visa expired.

"Positive temporary migration experiences set Australia up for future prosperity; that is, the economic and social returns from this programme keep on giving," the authors of Experiences of Temporary Residents concluded. *"It is clear that the programme is becoming more than a temporary stop-gap for local skills shortages and a renewed focus on long-term nation-building in immigration policy is needed."* But that is exactly what Australia is not doing.

Not quite Australian? The morality of temporary migration

Perhaps the most famous line ever written about temporary migration comes from Swiss playwright Max Fritsch, who said of the European guest worker programs of the 1960s: *"We asked for labour power, and people came."*

What ethical obligations do wealthy nations such as Australia have to migrants, especially when these countries no longer wish to settle as many as they once did, while still benefiting from their labour? Several political philosophers have wrestled with the question, and Peter Mares contrasts the ideas of three in his 2016 book, Not Quite Australian: How Temporary Migration is Changing the Nation.

The Canadian philosopher, Joseph Carens, argues for temporary migrants' full inclusion in democratic societies: anyone who is genuinely committed to liberal democracy must *"take seriously the moral claims of people who are outside a political community and want to get in."* American philosopher Michael Walzer is more sympathetic to a state's right to prevent an outsider from crossing its borders. While he agrees with Carens that inviting migrants into a society while denying them equal rights is a profound ethical concern, he draws a different conclusion: migrants should either be accepted as citizens or not invited at all. Temporary migration turns a nation into something like *"a family with live-in servants…inevitably, I think, a little tyranny."*

The Oxford University immigration theorist, Martin Ruhs, is more pragmatic: enabling workers to move from low-wage to high-wage countries has a powerful redistributive effect, for the migrants and for their families at home. Therefore, he argues, while migrants' rights to equal treatment before the law and at work must be upheld, it is reasonable to restrict some civil rights, such as the right to vote, in order to ensure that these countries keep taking migrants. Ruhs also believes that once temporary migrants have put down roots in a new country they should have a right to stay, but, unlike Carens, he believes migrants should therefore be asked to leave before these roots become too deep.


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As the number of temporary migrants in Australia grows but the number accepted for permanent residency remains capped, Mares's book charts stories of migrants in limbo for 10 years, sometimes longer, uncertain whether they can stay. What impact, he asks, does a state of permanent temporariness have on the nation, and on them?

He cites a 2013 study of Indian workers on 457 visas by academic Selvaraj Velayutham, who found that some spent five years at an Australian company without growing close to local colleagues. It seemed that the latter were reluctant to invest time in building friendships with these workers, who were understood to be temporary. *"There was also some resentment towards them from local IT workers who had seen colleagues displaced or downsized by their corporation and replaced by contract labour. The very presence of 457 visa workers made permanent workers feel a sense of insecurity in their own jobs."*

In recent years, some country towns with ageing and shrinking populations, such as Nhill and Pyramid Hill in Victoria and Dalwallinu in Western Australia, have begun to revive with the help of an influx of migrants or refugees. The stories are powerful, but what if the migrants do not or cannot stay? In ***a 2016 article for Inside Story,*** Mares follows filmmaker Malcolm McKinnon to Bordertown in South Australia, where 457 workers and asylum seekers on temporary visas comprise two-thirds of the 470 workers at the JBS Meatworks, the town's largest employer. Again, the story is heart-warming, but McKinnon also observes a lack of connection between migrants and many locals. It is *"not a product of rudeness, racism or fear,"* Mares writes. Rather, McKinnon *"has gained the impression that many locals don't reach out to the newcomers because they see the migrants as 'just passing through.'"*

Can Australians do the jobs that temporary migrants do?

In July 2017, the Federal Government introduced a scheme inviting jobseekers to earn up to $5000 a year picking fruit without losing their unemployment benefit. Three months later, just 14 people had signed up for the plan.

A year later, Prime Minister Morrison removed the carrot and produced the stick, announcing that welfare recipients would lose benefits for up to four weeks if they refused to take farm work without a reasonable excuse. The National Farmers' Federation (NFF) deplored the idea as a ***"shallow attempt at solving a deep problem."*** It argued that the short-term, seasonal and often remote nature of much farm labour made it unattractive to Australians with families, ongoing financial commitments and longer-term career aspirations. Only migrants would do the work, an NFF media release stated.

Temporary skilled workers have also been at the centre of the recurring but inconclusive debate about whether Australians can be trained to do jobs that migrants do. In March this year, the 457 visa was replaced by a Temporary Skills Shortage (TSS) visa that comes in two streams: a four-year visa that can be renewed indefinitely but limits the applicant's right to permanent residency, and a two-year visa that can be renewed once and provides no right to permanent residency at all.

Announcing the changes, which are already cutting the number of skilled migrant workers, the then Prime Minister, Malcolm Turnbull, said they put ***"Australian jobs and Australian values first."*** The changes also require companies, depending on their size, to pay a levy of $1200 or $1800 for every temporary migrant worker they hire, and $3000 or $5000 for every one they sponsor for citizenship. The money will go into a new $1.5 billion Skilling Australians Fund for apprentices and trainees. Far from opposing the changes, Labor said it would go even further to support Australian workers instead of temporary migrants.

How far will the move to reduce temporary skilled migration go? Figures in a 2018 report by migration researcher Bob Birrell, ***Australia's Skilled Migration Program: Scarce Skills Not Required,*** show that various professions on the government's skills list – notably accounting, engineering and ICT – are oversupplied with graduates. The counter view is that temporary skilled migrant workers make up less than 1 per cent of the workforce, so can hardly be accused of significantly driving up unemployment, especially when most of it is among unskilled workers.

Professor Birrell's report urges the government to go further, and remove from the migrant skills list a range of other occupations that he says are oversupplied. However, he believes that universities would lobby hard against such a move. *"They know that a significant factor in the choice of Australia as a study destination is the access this study provides to subsequent residence in Australia."* His comment points to the difficulties of cutting temporary migration, especially when it feeds one of Australia's most lucrative industries – international education.

China crisis? The tough trade-offs of temporary student migration

In 2018, the government proposed trying to reduce congestion, infrastructure and housing pressures on Sydney and Melbourne by directing new migrants to other capitals and regional centres. Prime Minister Scott Morrison told the media the government had some *"levers to pull"* to restrict the number of students in big city universities and push them to regional universities. A month later, however, *he seemed to have backed away from the idea,* saying: *"We would have to be very careful when it comes to the education industry. We don't engage in policies that will hold our economy back."*

A plan that seemed half-baked in general – what jobs would migrants do in areas that had much higher unemployment than the big cities? – seemed particularly ill thought out when it came to students.

The problem is that universities have become deeply, even dangerously, dependent on overseas student funds. *In a speech in October 2018,* Peter Varghese, Chancellor of the University of Queensland and former Secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, warned universities against over-reliance on fees from international students – especially from China.

Mr Varghese thought the number of Chinese students was good for Australian universities, for Australia and for China, to whom well over 80 per cent of their students returned after their time here. But he saw two potential threats to Chinese demand. The first was the multi-billion dollar investment China was making in higher education, as Australia's investment in its own universities fell. China now has a university in the top 30 of the Times Higher Education rankings. Australia, which has halved public funding of university budgets over the past 30 years, has none. Mr Varghese said it would be naïve to think that rising investment in China's university system would not over time weaken demand in China for an Australian education.

The second risk was whether China would choose, *"essentially for political reasons, to reduce the flow of students to Australia."* Over the past 40 years a thriving Australia-China relationship had contributed significantly to Australia's 27 years of uninterrupted economic growth. But as China moved to become the predominant power in Asia, replacing the United States, Mr Varghese thought that "those four decades are beginning to look like our salad days. What lies ahead looks more complicated at best and gloomy at worst."

In engaging with China, Mr Varghese urged Australia to develop a much clearer sense of how much economic pain it was prepared to bear if it took positions that protected its national interests but that China saw as cutting across its interests. This had particular force for universities, *"because some of the pain may be borne by them."* He urged them to diversify their sources of international students, focussing on India and Indonesia in particular, to give them resilience if the market abruptly shifted for reasons beyond their control. He also urged government to take a longer-term view of the role of universities in Australian life, and to reflect that in funding.

Tightening up: the Australian Government quietly reduces migrant numbers

Given Australia's growing preference for issuing temporary visas it may seem surprising that major areas of temporary migration are in decline. The cause, in large part, is the Australian Government's apparent ambivalence about migration, in a world in which anti-immigration feelings are sharply on the rise. The 2017-18 permanent migration figure of 162,000 is the lowest in a decade.

The cuts come in large part because of changes to temporary migration rules. ***Analysis by Abul Rizvi,*** a former senior Immigration Department official, shows that abolition of the 457 visa this year will accelerate a four-year fall in the stock of temporary migrants on a skilled work visa: from nearly 200,000 in June 2014 to 152,000 in September 2018, as a softer economy slowed employer demand. The number of working holiday makers has also dropped, from 160,000 in 2013 to 136,000 by September 2018, as the tax rate on their pay and media reports of employer exploitation have increased. (Whether it will rise again as a result of the recent changes remains to be seen).

Mr Rizvi believes that these numbers are falling in part because temporary migrants are finding it harder to obtain permanent residence. The National Farmers' Federation, university and employer groups have all called on the government to maintain pathways to permanent migration. But the government is going the other way. In April last year, it announced a plan to require permanent residents to wait four years, instead of one, before becoming citizens. For temporary migrants, this could stretch the period for obtaining citizenship to seven years or more. Introducing the bill in parliament, Home Affairs Minister Peter Dutton alluded to fears of terrorism when he said that ***"an increasingly challenging national security environment"*** made it necessary to look more closely at migrants before bestowing the "extraordinary privilege" of being Australian. Labor and Green senators thwarted the bill, but Mr Dutton has said he wants to reintroduce it.

A second plan, which emerged ***in a leaked government brief in 2016,*** would require migrants to take out a provisional visa before gaining permanent residence. Again, the goal seemed to be making it harder for them to become Australian, in case the government wanted to kick them out. These proposals would further reverse Australia's 70-year tradition of moving migrants quickly to citizenship.

For now, the immigration system is under huge strain, with people often waiting for years as visa processing times blow out under the weight of numbers and the government's desire to slow down the granting of both temporary and permanent visas and of citizenship. As migrants wait for a determination on a permanent or temporary visa, a record 197,000 of them have moved onto bridging visas. Another 220,000 are waiting for nine to 12 months to get a decision on their citizenship applications, compared to about 40,000 waiting an average of two months in 2015. This state of permanent temporariness, if it continues, will create a new landscape in this country.

Australia's choice: what to do about temporary and permanent migration?

How can temporary migrants be more seen and heard in Australia? Can universities do more to integrate domestic and international students? Should all temporary migrants have a council through which they could advise governments on issues affecting them?

New Zealand gives the vote to permanent residents and even migrants who have lived there for a year or more. To do the same in Australian federal elections would require a change to the Constitution, which is unlikely to occur, but could the franchise be widened for municipal or state elections? The goal of such reforms would be twofold: to end the contradiction between taxing working temporary migrants and denying them a voice in national life, and to build a society that was stronger because more residents had a stake in it.

In its overall immigration policy, Australia faces four broad options. First, it could move to cut both temporary and permanent migration. Over the long term this would reduce pressure on cities and might ease any public concerns about rapid social change caused by population growth. Yet it would damage particular industries, the Budget and economic growth. Over time, it would also hasten the ageing of the population, which in virtually any scenario will over time become a growing economic challenge as it reduces the ratio of workers to retirees.

The second option is to constrain the number of permanent migrants, while allowing the number of temporary migrants to stay high. This would present fewer short-term problems for industries that employ them, but it risks entrenching these industries as temporary migrant enclaves, unappealing to locals and open to exploitation. It would also leave more temporary migrants unable to convert to permanent residence and take full part in the life of the country. Over time, their number would fall, as migrants, especially those with skills in demand, left for better options elsewhere.

The third option is to significantly constrain temporary migration and strengthen the permanent program. This approach, which Labor might be contemplating, would reduce workplace exploitation created by the precarious status of temporary migrants and might help to reassert a common national story based on encouraging more residents to become citizens. Yet the move to temporary migration has yielded such benefits to employers and the economy that it is hard to see how returning all skilled migration to the permanent program makes sense.

The last option is to encourage temporary migration while enabling substantial numbers of temporary migrants to convert to permanent residence. This would leave migration's economic benefits intact while leaving fewer temporary migrants in long-term limbo. As the high migration route, however, it would require heavy investment in infrastructure and housing, and is more likely to generate anxiety about the pace of cultural change.

Each of these options would bring benefits and costs; each would require a government willing to make the case for it, and to set out the trade-offs it would incur. Instead, in 2018 the government hovered between options one and two, explaining or endorsing neither, seemingly caught between Prime Minister Scott Morrison's stated support for the migration program and Home Affairs Minister Peter Dutton's clear intent to cut it. ***A speech by Mr Morrison in late 2018*** finally revealed the government's plan: reduce migration to Sydney and Melbourne while directing migrants to other parts of the country by asking states and territories to develop targeted population plans. Involving these governments more in migration decisions has merit, yet the government revealed no detailed thinking on any aspects of its approach, and its success remains uncertain.

In October 2018 Labor leader Bill Shorten wrote to Mr Morrison proposing a bipartisan approach to developing a national population policy. Again, it was an idea with merit, yet to date there is little sign that Labor has thought deeply about migration policy or that it in power it would do a better job of forthrightly discussing such policy, when governments around the world have failed to do so.

The ambivalence of politicians may simply reflect public opinion. For a decade between 2007 and 2017, authoritative polling from the Scanlon Foundation, the Lowy Institute and the ANU showed that a majority of Australians favoured high immigration. But this year's Lowy poll showed ***"a sharp spike"*** in anti-immigration feeling, from 40 to 54 per cent over the past year. The trend is more likely to be sustained when neither main political party is prepared to speak up for immigration beyond touting its economic value.

The parties are no doubt influenced by news from Europe, where nearly every nation is reducing or rejecting immigration, and from the United States, the world's flagship immigration nation but now deeply divided by the issues of border control and long-term demographic change. The inflamed debates in these places are shaped as much by fears of cultural loss among majority white populations as they are by economics.

These seismic changes might come to divide Australia, too, turning the country away from immigration. Or perhaps Australia is different. For 70 years, an immigration program tightly controlled by government has transformed the economy and society, sometimes in the face of public unease but with broad public acceptance, in hindsight, that the changes were right. A brave government could still argue that Australia's future lay with a large but well-managed program, sensitive to economic conditions and public opinion, and based on both permanent and temporary migrants.

At present that scenario looks unlikely. But as events overseas reveal, if politicians in power refuse to openly discuss immigration, other people will fill the gap.

Institute discussion of the narrative

In October 2018, members of the Scanlon Institute for Applied Social Cohesion Research, representing non-government and government organisations in every state, met to discuss a draft of the Narrative on temporary migration set out above. A number of themes emerged from the meeting.

Institute Chair Professor Peter Shergold, Chancellor of the University of Western Sydney, opened the discussion by pointing out that neither politicians nor the Australian people have any idea of the sheer variety of the kinds of temporary migrants who are present in Australia, or the scale of their numbers, or the size of the policy shift towards temporary migration that has occurred this century.

One reason for the ignorance, he said, is that temporary migrants are invisible, indistinguishable in the street from permanent migrants or the native-born. He welcomed the production of this Narrative as a way to shed light on a poorly understood area of Australian life.

A participant from Western Australia noted that in his state, unlike in NSW and Victoria, concern about immigration, both permanent and temporary, did not focus on crowded cities but on whether migrants took jobs from locals. The social benefits of temporary migration needed to be explored and better explained, because government and perhaps popular attitudes to temporary migrants seemed to be summed up by the Meatloaf line: *"I want you, I need you, but there ain't no way I'm ever going to love you."*

Other participants agreed that the experiences of temporary migrants, and attitudes toward them, varied from state to state and from city to region. South Australia, for example, had long been pushing the Federal Government to help it build its population through migration. Some regions were also crying out for new people, yet participants were sceptical that the Government's plan, floated in 2018, to strongly encourage or force new migrants to live in the regions for five years would succeed or contribute to the sustainable growth and productivity of the receiving area. In particular, forcing international students to study at a regional university could have a disastrous impact on the education industry; people simply would not come.

The meeting explored other apparent contradictions in government policy toward temporary migrants, such as building up student numbers while raising the hurdles they had to jump before they could become permanent residents, or using various tests to force migrants to prove themselves as *"Aussie"* enough before being accepted for citizenship.

One participant emphasised the need to be clear about whether there was a problem to solve. Was it economic, social, moral? *"What do we want people to do? Is there a for-or-against argument about temporary migration? Handled well, it contributes to an open, innovative, global society."*

All participants agreed that temporary migrants are vulnerable to exploitation in the workforce. Nevertheless, all surveys showed that both temporary migrants and their employers expressed a positive view of a migrants' time in Australia. An example was of one small community in Queensland that had strongly opposed the deportation of a family of temporary migrants – in this case, asylum seekers. One participant thought that these battles were likely to increase and be more public if deportations of migrants whose visas had expired were to also increase.

The meeting discussed the impact of temporary migration on source countries. Many migrants send large sums home through remittances – a source of funding to developing countries that is significantly greater than foreign aid. Yet some countries are sorry to be losing talent to Australia. One participant, a migrant himself, said that migrants and their children have increasingly strong connections to their home countries, and expect and hope that they can contribute to them. *"They are not necessarily coming because it is heaven here but for education, health and well-being, and then they would like to go back, or to move between the two countries."*

How, one participant asked, do we bring more temporary migrants into the embrace of the Australian community? Various ideas were mooted. Should temporary migrants have a council through which they could advise governments on issues affecting them? Could they get a vote in municipal or state elections (a vote in national elections would require a change to the Constitution)? The goal of any such reforms would be to end the contradiction between taxing working temporary migrants and denying them a voice in the life of the nation.

In summary, participants noted that the move to increase the number of temporary migrants was a profound change that had largely occurred without any public or policy discussion. Exploration of the topic should be strongly encouraged and include both the advantages of temporary migration – both to the migrants and to locals – and the potential downsides, such as workforce exploitation. There is also the potential risk to social cohesion created by inviting large numbers of people into the country while constricting their pathways to citizenship, where citizenship had once been recognised for its power in building social cohesion and loyalty.

All participants also thought it was important to see temporary migration through a global, as well as Australian, lens. Large numbers of Australians are taking on temporary status overseas; Peter Shergold noted that broadly speaking, one migrant arrived in Australia roughly every minute, and one resident left every two minutes. It was one more example of our increasingly mobile world.

Considerations for practical application

1. Temporary migrants can be hidden in our communities. Finding ways to discover the statistics on temporary migrants in your area will be essential to ensuring the right services and support. Temporary migrants include students, temporary skilled workers, working holiday makers, some people on bridging visas and some other visas. It is important to knowing the kinds, numbers and percentage of temporary migrants in your community and the trend over time.

2. Understanding the growth in temporary migrants in your areas will make planning more precise. The number of temporary migrants in Australia is likely to increase and each category has different expectations. Some will have quite profound feelings of insecurity while others will be ambitious to take advantage of education systems, find ways to actively participate and extend their careers. Still others will need to feel welcome in order to feel a sense of belonging. Most importantly, we now have a responsibility to make their time in Australia as successful as possible so that when they leave they are our best advocates.

3. We all know that we need to report any instances of exploitation and to track these so that the issues can be addressed efficiently and effectively.

4. For temporary migrants, building a sense of belonging may not be straightforward. Knowing that they are valued and have ways to participate in the larger society is just as important to social cohesion as it is to the individual's sense of well-being. Having a voice on common issues in the local community and being recognised for the constraints they face will build respect and enable others to appreciate their contribution.

5. Some temporary migrants will happily leave Australia when their visa expires, others will seek to move onto bridging or a different visa type in search of permanent residency. Still others may choose to take the risk of overstaying their visa. Each of these pathways will need different services and support, but in all situations, the realistic management of expectations and time lines will be essential.

6. Any discussion of new migrant communities needs to be balanced with recognition of the fears and potential sense of loss that established community members may perceive. Messaging to not only acknowledge these fears but to seek to alleviate them are important.

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About the Scanlon Institute for Applied Social Cohesion Research

The Scanlon Institute for Applied Social Cohesion Research exists as a bridge between academic insight and public thought, to support the advancement of Australia as a welcoming, prosperous and cohesive nation.

The body is an initiative of the Scanlon Foundation and furthers its belief that Australia's future prosperity, underpinned by continued population growth, will depend on our ability to maintain, foster and support social cohesion in our communities amidst ever-growing cultural diversity.

The Institute is a virtual organisation that unites Australia's leading thinkers on immigration to produce a bi-annual journal highlighting important lessons from recent findings and exploring how they can be practically applied.

Research on immigration, population and related matters comes from academic institutions, independent think tanks and commentators. This is vital, important work, and it deserves an influential place in the public consciousness.

To ensure that happens, it must be consolidated and interpreted in a way so as to be digestible and practically usable by the people and organisations working directly in communities.

That's what the Institute does. It links thought to action to ensure debate drives the agenda and empowers the critical thinking that will drive our country's interests.

About the Narrator

James Button, a former Walkley Award winning journalist and speechwriter, is Narrator of the Scanlon Institute for Applied Social Cohesion Research. The role of the Narrator is to curate academic reports, commentary and publications that relate to social cohesion, and synthesise the thinking into a narrative that brings their rationale and findings to the fore and encourages consideration.

About the Scanlon Foundation

The Scanlon Foundation was established in 2001 with the endeavour to enhance and foster social cohesion within Australia.

It was formed on a view that Australia, with the exception of Australia's First Peoples, is and always will be a migrant nation.

The Scanlon Foundation aspires to see Australia advance as a welcoming, prosperous and cohesive nation, particularly in relation to the transition of migrants into Australian Society. The Foundation supports ongoing research into the indicators of social cohesion and the results of this research inform the Foundation's activities.

The Foundation makes grants to improve social cohesion in areas of greatest need within Australia.

List of Institute members

Chancellor Professor Peter Shergold AC, Chair

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1. **Viv Nguyen** | President, Vietnamese Community in Australia/Vic Chapter Inc
2. **Anna Parle** | Chief Resilience Officer, Multicultural Affairs and Social Cohesion, Department of Premier and Cabinet, State of Victoria
3. **Carmel Guerra** | CEO, Centre of Multicultural Youth
4. **Abdiaziz Farah** | Somali Community Champion
5. **Cath Scarth** | CEO, AMES
6. **Ali Ahmed** | CEO, Youth Activating Youth
7. **Kiros Hiruy** | Senior Research Fellow, Centre for Social Impact, Swinburne University
8. **Andrea Pearman** | Australia Post and Inclusive Australia
9. **Robert Gruhn** | Senior Policy Officer, Ethnic Communities' Council of Victoria

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10. **Dylan Smith** | Executive Officer, Fremantle Foundation
11. **Stuart Tomlinson** | CEO, Fremantle Multicultural Centre, Inc.
12. **Hannah Fitch-Rabbitt** | CEO, Fremantle Multicultural Centre, Inc.

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13. **Mackayla Jeffries** | Director, Community Engagement, Anti-Discrimination Commission, Queensland
14. **Aleem Ali** | National Manager, Welcoming Cities
15. **Julie McDougall** | Director, Multicultural Affairs Queensland
16. **Rohan Cassell** | Community and Social Football Manager, Football Queensland

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17. **Jodie Van Deventer** | CEO, Committee for Adelaide
18. **Mohammad Al-khafaji** | Acting CEO, FECCA

Sydney

19. **Martin Stewart-Weeks** | Principal, Public Purpose and part of The Impact Assembly at PwC
20. **Rob Schonberger** | Bread and Butter Project
21. **Reyna Flynn** | Bread and Butter Project
22. **Jackie Ruddock** | The Social Outfit
23. **Megan Lancaster** | Director, Community Engagement at Multicultural NSW
24. **Margaret Teed** | Mentor Coordinator, City East Community College
25. **Mahir Momand** | CEO, Thrive
26. **Malcolm Haddon** | Senior Community Relations Adviser, Multicultural NSW

Canberra

27. **Jack Archer** | CEO, Regional Australia Institute
28. **Dr Emma Campbell** | CEO, Federation of Ethnic Communities

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Contact

info@scanloninstitute.org.au

scanloninstitute.org.au

@Scanlon_Inst

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